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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Legislative histories and case decisions related to federal intellectual property 
(IP) law are teeming with pronouncement of the need for and value of 
“uniformity,” particularly with respect to patent and copyright laws because 
they are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts and because the 
asserted value of uniformity lies at the very heart of the Intellectual Property 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.1  As explained by James Madison in The 
Federalist No. 43, “the States cannot separately make effectual provision for 
either [patents or copyrights].”2  Justice Story elaborated on this point in his 
commentaries on the Constitution when he explained: 
It is beneficial to all parties, that the national government should 
possess this power; to authors and inventors, because, otherwise, 
they would be subjected to the varying laws and systems of the 
different states on this subject, which would impair, and might 
even destroy the value of their rights; to the public, as it will 
promote the progress of science and the useful arts, and admit 
the people at large, after a short interval, to the full possession 
and enjoyment of all writings and inventions without restraint.3 
As so used, “uniformity” is short-hand for a single federal rule or standard 
on a given issue of law (“federal uniformity”), as opposed to the way the term 
was used in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins to refer to the same rules and standards 
being applied regardless of whether a lawsuit is filed in state or federal court 
within a state (“Erie uniformity”).4  The term “federal uniformity” is used 
herein, instead of “national uniformity,” to refer to the uniformity that arises 
from the enactment of federal laws as opposed to the uniformity that arises 
from the adoption of uniform state laws. 
In recent decades, the federal uniformity argument has been used to justify: 
the creation of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals as the exclusive circuit 
                                                                                                                   
 1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 2 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 259 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 502, at 
402 (R. Rotunda & J. Nowak eds., 1987). 
 4 Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1938).  See also Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 
326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (stating: “The nub of the policy that underlies [Erie] is that for the same 
transaction the accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of in a State 
court a block away, should not lead to a substantially different result.”).  
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court to hear appeals of district court judgments in patent cases;5 vesting federal 
judges with the job of interpreting patent claims;6 and Copyright term 
extension.7  It was also a primary justification for the May 11, 2016 enactment 
of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016.8  Indeed, it seems that the argument 
surfaces anytime Congress wants to assert more of a role in dictating the details 
of law and policy, despite the fact that it conflicts with the U.S. system of 
federalism by favoring federal laws over state laws and federal uniformity over 
Erie uniformity. 
Contemporary scholars have identified a number of rationales for federal 
uniformity, including: the need to maintain the legitimacy of the federal courts; 
the unfairness of treating similarly situated litigants differently; the need for 
predictability; and the inefficiency of making multi-state actors comply with 
divergent legal standards.9  An underlying assumption of the federal uniformity 
argument is that if Congress passes a federal law to govern a particular area of 
law then the legal principles governing that law will be interpreted and applied 
in a uniform manner, leading to greater predictability and efficiency.  In areas 
where state law can also govern (like trademark and trade secret law), it also 
assumes that state law lacks sufficiently uniform rules and standards.  In this 
regard, “uniformity” is often used to mean “unified” or “same,” rather than 
“harmonized” or “similar,”10 with an additional assumption being that 
uniformity is preferred over harmonization. 
As detailed in Part II of this Article, there are numerous reasons why the 
ability of federal laws to unify legal principles is more myth than reality.11  Chief 
among them is the United States system of federalism which, even with respect 
                                                                                                                   
 5 H.R. REP. NO. 97–312, at 20 (1981).  See also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A 
Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1989). 
 6 Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) (stating “we see the 
importance of the uniformity in the treatment of a given patent as an independent reason to 
allocate all issues of construction to the court”). 
 7 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 243 (2003) (Beyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing the uniformity 
argument). 
 8 S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 4 (2016). 
 9 Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1596 Part I (2008). 
 10 See generally Camilla Baasch Andersen, Defining Uniformity in Law, 12 UNIF. L. REV. nn.5, 5–15 
(2007) (exploring how the term “uniform” is used internationally, comparing it to the term 
“harmonisation,” and noting that true uniformity is an absurdity). 
 11 The same observation has been made with respect to other areas of law seemingly reserved 
to the federal government.  See Robert Force, Deconstructing Jensen: Admiralty and Federalism in the 
Twenty-First Century, 32 J. MAR. L. & COM. 517 (2001) (arguing for continued use of state laws in 
some admiralty situations); Robert D. Peltz, The Myth of Uniformity in Maritime Law, 21 TUL. MAR. 
L.J. 103 (1996) (lamenting the failure of the federal courts to insist on more uniformity). 
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to federal laws, often requires federal courts to apply state law.12  There is also 
the very practical problem that circuit splits cannot be resolved until a case is 
presented before the U.S. Supreme Court and it decides to hear the issue.13 
Even then, the decisions of the Supreme Court do not always provide enough 
guidance to prevent further divergences in how the applicable federal law is 
applied.  One need only look at the jurisprudence under our existing federal 
patent, copyright, and trademark laws to know that federal uniformity is a myth.  
Each of these federal statutes have existed for decades, but circuit splits remain 
on numerous important issues.14  This is not to suggest that federal laws are not 
needed with respect to these matters, but rather, it suggests that when adopting 
federal laws, we should not assume that federal uniformity will follow.  Instead, 
we should identify the specific issues upon which true uniformity is most 
important and legislate more carefully with respect to them, leaving other issues 
to, potentially, be non-uniform.  More importantly, when adopting federal laws, 
we should look for adequate justifications for the federal legislation beyond the 
claimed need for uniformity.  Otherwise, all we are doing is shifting law-making 
power from the states to Congress and the federal courts. 
This Article begins in Part I with examples of uniformity problems that have 
arisen with respect to federal intellectual property (IP) laws.  In Part II, it 
categorizes the uniformity problems and in the process, demonstrates that a 
lack of uniformity in law is not always the result of divergent views of states, 
but can result from divergent views among federal judges or due to the facts of 
                                                                                                                   
 12 See infra Part II. 
 13 Frost, supra note 9, at 1569 (noting that “seventy percent of [the Supreme] Court’s plenary 
docket is devoted to addressing legal issues on which lower courts have differed, . . .”).   
 14 See, e.g., Michael Landau & Donald E. Biederman, The Case for a Specialized Copyright Court: 
Eliminating the Jurisdictional Advantage, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 717, 737–39 (1999) (decrying 
the prevalence of circuit splits on copyright issues); Jennifer E. Rothman, Commercial Speech, 
Commercial Use and the Intellectual Property Quagmire, 101 VA. L. REV. 1929, 1935–37 (2015) (discussing 
the inconsistent application of First Amendment principles to trademark law).  A recent crowd-
sourcing request of intellectual property (IP) scholars resulted in a long list of other IP issues upon 
which there are circuit splits, or in the case of the Federal Circuit, internal circuit splits, including: the 
meaning of the de minimis copyright defense related to music sampling (from David S. Levine); the 
test for nominative fair use under trademark law and the free speech defense to rights of publicity 
(from Mark Lemley); the test of unlawful appropriation under copyright law and whether “making 
available” is a distribution under copyright law (from Yvette Liebesman); the useful article doctrine 
of copyright law (from Margot Kaminski), although the Supreme Court recently opined on such 
issue in Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands, 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017); the test for substantial similarity under 
copyright law and whether contracts are per se immune from copyright preemption (from Guy Rub); 
the scope of the Rogers v. Grimaldi defense under rights of publicity law (from Bill McGeveran); the 
scope of the famous mark exception in trademark law and the extraterritorial extent of the Lanham 
Act (from Tim Holbrook); and the definition and application of transformativeness under copyright 
law (from Shubha Ghosh and Ann Bartow).  
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a particular case.  Parts III and IV reflect upon the asserted benefits of 
uniformity and how uniformity problems might be reduced through better 
legislative processes and drafting.  The Article concludes with the observation 
that there may be times when a lack of uniformity is to be preferred over more 
detailed or preemptive federal legislation.  
II.  IP UNIFORMITY PROBLEMS 
One need look no further than the circumstances surrounding the creation 
of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeal in 1982 to realize that federal uniformity 
is often a myth.  When the Federal Circuit was created, uniformity in the 
interpretation and application of U.S. patent laws was its principal goal.15  But 
that goal demonstrates the myth of uniformity of federal laws because, in 
theory, having an “exclusive” federal patent law should have already resulted in 
the desired federal uniformity because the potential for conflicts between state 
laws and federal laws was eliminated.  However, as David Taylor noted, another 
justification for the creation of the Federal Circuit was concern that the U.S. 
Supreme Court was not doing its job to resolve conflicts among federal circuit 
courts.16  The proponents of the Federal Circuit also argued that the judges of 
the existing circuit courts did not have enough scientific and patent law 
expertise (or interest) to decide patent cases, and thus a specialized court of 
patent law experts was needed.17  While the establishment of the Federal Circuit 
has been credited with creating more uniformity in patent law,18 it is also 
criticized for simply shifting the debates about the meaning and application of 
patent law from a battle of circuit courts to battles between different panels of 
the Federal Circuit and between the Federal Circuit and the U.S. Supreme 
                                                                                                                   
 15 S. REP. NO. 97–275, at 4–6 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N 11, 14–16 (“The creation of 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit will produce desirable uniformity in this area of law.  
Such uniformity will reduce the forum-shopping that is common to patent litigation”).  See also S. 
Jay Plager, The United States Courts of Appeals, the Federal Circuit, and the Non-Regional Subject Matter 
Concept: Reflections on the Search for a Model, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 853, 854–55 (1990) (“The impetus 
behind the establishment of the Federal Circuit was the desire to bring about greater uniformity 
and coherency . . . .”). 
 16 David O. Taylor, Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent Law Adjudication: Rules and Standards, 46 
CONN. L. REV. 415, 415 (2013). 
 17 Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791, 1801 
(2013). 
 18 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of Age, 
23 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 787, 788–89 (2008). 
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Court.19  Moreover, creation of the Federal Circuit did not resolve the lack of 
uniformity that results from the highly fact-dependent application of patent law. 
The experience of patent law before the creation of the Federal Circuit 
demonstrates that just because a federal law is adopted does not mean it will be 
interpreted and applied in accordance with uniform rules or standards.  
However, before suggesting more specialized courts to increase uniformity in 
IP law, the reasons for the lack of uniformity should be considered to determine 
whether uniformity should or can ever be achieved.20  As is explored more fully 
in Part II of this Article, there are reasons for a lack of federal uniformity that 
have nothing to do with the structure of the federal courts and have a lot to do 
with other principles of law, including federalism.  The discussion that follows 
gives an overview of some of the reasons based upon the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
intellectual property jurisprudence.  
A.  LACK OF UNIFORMITY IN SUPREME COURT’S IP JURISPRUDENCE 
Because the IP Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress power to 
adopt federal laws for the promotion of the arts and sciences, state power to 
regulate in these areas would seem to be preempted or precluded, but this is not 
the case.  Even in cases of a strong Constitutional grant of federal power and a 
comprehensive federal statute, like the Patent and Copyright Acts, the federal 
judiciary is reluctant to supplant state law.  Thus, absent an express preemption 
provision, and despite differences of opinion concerning the ease with which 
implied preemption may be found, federal courts often fail to find implied 
preemption, or even the displacement, of state laws.21  Moreover, as Professor 
Roderick Hills explained: “The concern for overextending the legitimacy of 
federal courts has tempered the Court’s willingness to displace swathes of state 
law with judicially crafted federal common law absent some sort of specific 
congressional guidance.”22  Numerous cases in the area of IP law bear this 
observation out.23 
                                                                                                                   
 19 Taylor, supra note 16, at 456–58 (detailing the four cases where the U.S. Supreme Court 
overturned decisions by the Federal Circuit). See also Plager, supra note 15, at 857 (analyzing the 
emergence of intracircuit battles as opposed to intercircuit battles). 
 20 But see Landau & Biederman, supra note 14, at 718. 
 21 See generally Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National 
Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2007) (explaining federal preemption jurisprudence and the 
scholarly debate concerning the appropriate approach thereto). 
 22 Id. at 9. 
 23 See JEANNE C. FROMER, The Intellectual Property Clause’s Preemptive Effect, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 265, 265 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., Cambridge University 
Press, 2013), for a more in-depth discussion of the Supreme Court’s preemption analysis in IP cases. 
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For instance, in Goldstein v. California, the Supreme Court considered whether 
a state law of California which made it a crime to transfer sounds from a sound 
recording was unconstitutional on a variety of grounds, including the alleged 
intention of Congress to establish a uniform law across the land.24  (At the time 
the case was filed, federal copyright law did not provide protection for sound 
recordings.) The Court could have made U.S. law with respect to creative works 
more uniform by invalidating the California statute, but refused to do so, 
holding that the IP Clause “neither explicitly precludes the States from granting 
copyrights nor grants such authority exclusively to the Federal Government.”25  
On the issue of preemption, the Court quoted Hines v. Davidowitz to explain: 
“Our primary function is to determine whether, under the circumstances of this 
particular case, [the state] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”26  Finding no such 
obstacle, the Court held that the California statute was a proper exercise of 
powers reserved to the states and that the law was not preempted by either the 
1909 Copyright Act or the 1971 Sound Recording Act.27  
The importance of the Goldstein Court’s ruling with respect to federal 
uniformity (or lack thereof) is put into perspective by the dissents. Justice 
Douglas argued that two earlier Supreme Court cases, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. 
Stiffel Co.28 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,29  
make clear that the federal policy expressed in [the IP Clause], is 
to have “national uniformity in patent and copyright laws, . . ., a 
policy bolstered by Acts of Congress which vest “exclusive 
jurisdiction to hear patent and copyright cases in federal 
courts . . . and that section of the Copyright Act which expressly 
saves state protection of unpublished writings but does not 
include published writings.”30 
Consistent with Justice Story’s observations, supra, Justice Douglas’s plea for 
federal uniformity was due, in large part, to a concern about monopoly power 
and not wanting to give states the power to limit free competition and the 
dissemination of information.  In other words, he viewed the federal interest in 
                                                                                                                   
 24 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973). 
 25 Id. at 560. 
 26 See id. at 561 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 27 Id. at 571. 
 28 376 U.S. 225 (1964). 
 29 Id. at 234. 
 30 Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 573 (quoting Sears, Roebuck Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, n.7 (1964)). 
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preventing monopolies and ensuring the free-flow of public information as 
overriding the traditional deference to the states.  Justice Marshall’s dissent 
expanded upon this theme when he noted that: “Congress has decided that free 
competition should be the general rule, until it is convinced that the failure to 
provide copyright or patent protection is hindering ‘the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts.’ ”31  However, the need for federal uniformity related to creative 
works was rejected in Goldstein in favor of the local values that were expressed 
in the California law. 
Decisions by the Supreme Court since Goldstein reveal that, in the absence of 
an express preemption provision, sometimes federal IP statutes preempt or 
displace state law, and sometimes they do not.  Whether such preemption is 
found usually depends upon whether the challenged state law conflicts with the 
underlying federal policy, not including an interest in federal uniformity.  For 
instance, in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,32 the trade secret law of Ohio was not 
preempted, but in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,33 Florida’s plug-
molding statute was preempted.  Underlying both decisions were principles of 
federalism balanced against the strong U.S. policy that favors the use and 
dissemination of publicly available information and the related disclosure 
purpose of U.S. patent law.  In finding no conflict that would justify 
preemption of state trade secret law, the Court in Kewanee explained: 
States may hold diverse viewpoints in protecting intellectual 
property to invention as they do in protecting the intellectual 
property relating to the subject matter of copyright.  The only 
limitation on the States is that in regulating the area of patents 
and copyrights they do not conflict with the operation of the laws 
in this area passed by Congress. . . .34 
Similarly, although finding Florida’s statute preempted, Justice O’Connor 
explained in Bonito Boats: 
Our decisions since Sears and Compco have made it clear that the 
Patent and Copyright Clauses do not, by their own force or by 
negative implication, deprive the States of the power to adopt 
rules for the promotion of intellectual creation within their own 
                                                                                                                   
 31 Id. at 579 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
 32 416 U.S. 470 (1974). 
 33 489 U.S. 141 (1989). 
 34 Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 479.  
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jurisdictions. . . .  Thus, where “Congress determines that neither 
federal protection nor freedom from restraint is required by the 
national interest,” the States remain free to promote originality 
and creativity in their own domains.35 
The difference in Bonito Boats was that Florida’s statute was found to conflict 
with U.S. patent law in ways that Ohio’s trade secret law did not, principally 
because the Florida statute operated to protect ideas disclosed to the public.36  
A desire for uniformity in the application of federal law had little bearing on the 
Court’s decision. 
More recently, the Supreme Court confronted the federal uniformity 
argument in POM Wonderful, LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., a case involving an asserted 
conflict between two federal laws: the false advertising provisions of the federal 
Lanham Act and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).37  Coca-
Cola argued that the FDCA precludes application of the Lanham Act with 
respect to food and beverage labeling because of Congress’s desire to achieve 
federal uniformity.  Citing Bonito Boats, among other cases, the Court rejected 
Coca-Cola’s uniformity argument, observing that: “Congress not infrequently 
permits a certain amount of variability by authorizing a federal cause of action 
even in areas of law where national uniformity is important.”38  In other words, 
despite frequent congressional protestations in favor of federal uniformity, the 
Court recognized that Congress often adopts laws, or provisions of law, that are 
inconsistent with that goal.  Thus, the Court refused to ignore one federal law in 
favor of another, even though the FDCA was adopted with federal uniformity 
in mind, finding that the plaintiff’s claim for false advertising under the Lanham 
Act was not impliedly precluded by the FDCA.  
The significance of the Pom decision on the issue of uniformity is not limited 
to the Court’s refusal to find that the FDCA precluded a claim under the 
                                                                                                                   
 35 Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 165 (citing Aronson v. Quick Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 
(1979); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 552–61 (1973); Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 478–479 
(quoting Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 559)).  See also Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262 (stating “Commercial 
agreements traditionally are the domain of state law.  State law is not displaced merely because the 
contract relates to intellectual property which may or may not be patentable; . . .”). 
 36 Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 156 (1989) (“At the heart of Sears and Compco is the conclusion 
that the efficient operation of the federal patent system depends upon substantially free trade in 
publicly known, unpatented design and utilitarian conceptions.”).  See also Brulotte v. Thys Co., 
379 U.S. 29, 31 (1964) (“But these rights become public property once the 17-year period 
expires.” (first citing Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185; and then citing Kellogg 
Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118)). 
 37 POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2233 (2014). 
 38 Id. at 2240. 
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Lanham Act, but extends to the Court’s recognition that a lack of uniformity 
often results from the fact-specific nature of a federal claim.  Distinguishing 
between a lack of uniformity on the face of a federal statute, and that which is 
caused by the fact specific nature of the required inquiry, the Court noted that: 
“The variability about which Coca–Cola complains is no different than the 
variability that any industry covered by the Lanham Act faces.”39  In other 
words, even where the legislative history of a federal law may indicate a 
congressional desire for uniformity, the actual language of the statute, 
particularly variable and amorphous standards, will naturally lead to a lack of 
uniformity in results. 
B.  FEDERAL COURTS OFTEN APPLY STATE LAW 
As the foregoing demonstrates, there are two interrelated consequences of 
principles of federalism and the fact that U.S. IP laws do not always preempt, 
preclude, or displace overlapping state or federal laws.  First, complementary 
and overlapping state and federal laws often co-exist.40  More significantly with 
respect to the issue of federal uniformity (discussed more fully below), the 
existence of complementary or overlapping state law means that there is a body 
of law that federal courts can use when interpreting and applying federal law.  
In this regard, although it is often assumed that federal courts only apply federal 
law in federal question cases, in fact, they also apply state law in a number of 
situations, including because: (1) the federal statute expressly incorporates state 
law; (2) the language of the federal statute is ambiguous; or (3) there is a gap in 
the federal statute caused by a lack of sufficient details or definitions.41  Because 
the state law that is applied in such situations is often the law of the forum state, 
it is possible for the application of federal law to differ depending upon the 
state in which a lawsuit is brought.42 
There are several IP cases that illustrate the federal courts’ use of state law to 
determine the meaning of a federal statute and fills its gaps, some of which have 
resulted in less federal uniformity rather than more.  For instance, in De Sylva v. 
                                                                                                                   
 39 Id. 
 40 See, e.g., Alexander J. Callen, Note, Avoiding Double Recovery: Assessing Liquidated Damages in Private 
Wage and Hour Actions Under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law, 81 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1881, 1919 (2013) (discussing overlapping state and federal laws governing employee wages). 
 41 See CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§ 4514–4520 (3d ed. 
2016). 
 42 See text accompanying infra notes 70–82. 
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Ballentine, the Court applied the state law of California to determine the meaning 
of “children” under the 1909 Copyright Act.43  Justice Harlan explained: 
The scope of a federal right is, of course, a federal question, but 
that does not mean that its content is not to be determined by 
state, rather than federal law.  This is especially true where a 
statute deals with a familial relationship; there is no federal law of 
domestic relations, which is primarily a matter of state concern.44 
Importantly on the issue of uniformity, the Court did not adopt California’s 
definition of “children” for all purposes, but only for the subject case.  The use 
of state law is because of the Erie Court’s direction that state law should apply 
in such circumstances and the preference of the Supreme Court for the use of 
the law of the forum state when filling gaps in a federal statute.45  
Application of the preference for the law of the forum state to fill gaps, 
while not leading to federal uniformity, should at least result to Erie uniformity.  
However, for a variety of reasons, this preference is not always followed when 
interpreting a federal statute or filling its gaps.  For instance, in the famous 
copyright case of Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,46 the Court applied 
the common law as expressed in the Restatement of Agency, rather than the law of 
the forum state, to determine the meanings of “employee” and “scope of 
employment” as used in the 1976 Copyright Act’s definition of a work made for 
hire.47  In so doing, the Court applied a well-established canon of statutory 
construction that favors the common law, explaining: 
It is . . . well established that “[w]here Congress uses terms that 
have accumulated settled meaning under . . . the common law, a 
court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that 
Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these 
terms.” . . .  In the past, when Congress has used the term 
“employee” without defining it, we have concluded that Congress 
                                                                                                                   
 43 351 U.S. 570, 580–82 (1956). 
 44 Id. (citing Reconst. Fin. Corp. v. Beaver Cty., 328 U.S. 204; Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. United 
States, 308 U.S. 343, 351–52). 
 45 See text accompanying infra notes 70–75, 89. 
 46 490 U.S. 730, 730 (1989). 
 47 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989) (“The Act nowhere 
defines the terms ‘employee’ or ‘scope of employment.’ ”). 
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intended to describe the conventional master-servant relationship 
as understood by common-law agency doctrine.48 
Similarly, in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., the Court looked to common law 
to determine the meaning of the 1976 Copyright Act’s “first sale doctrine,” 
explaining: “ ‘[W]hen a statute covers an issue previously governed by the 
common law,’ we must presume that ‘Congress intended to retain the substance 
of the common law.’ ”49  
As decisions of the Supreme Court, the definitions used in Reid and Kirtsaeng 
are now the “supreme law of the land,” binding on all federal courts unless 
Congress decides to change those definitions.50  Thus, once a case is decided by 
the Supreme Court and the meaning of a statutory term is fixed, a federal 
uniformity problem only arises when Supreme Court precedent is misapplied.  
However, it may take years or decades before the Supreme Court rules on the 
meaning of a federal statute and, in the meantime, the lower federal courts may 
adopt differing definitions of terms used in federal statutes by applying the law 
of the forum state, using some other source of law to fill the gaps, or making its 
own law.   
Congress can reduce the instances of varying definitions and improve federal 
uniformity by exercising more care to define statutory terms.  Or, if it does not 
want the law of the forum state to apply, it can adopt a specific provision of law 
which, in effect, precludes application of the law of the forum state.  One such 
provision was at issue in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., involving a circuit 
split on the question of whether the equitable defense of laches could apply 
within the statute of limitation period specified by the 1976 Copyright Act.51  As 
Justice Ginsburg explained, “[u]ntil 1957, federal copyright law did not include a 
statute of limitations for civil suits.  Federal courts therefore used analogous state 
statutes of limitations to determine the timeliness of infringement claims.”52  With 
the adoption of the 1976 Copyright Act, however, Congress decided that federal 
uniformity on the issue was important and that a three-year statute of limitations 
would apply.53  Thus, the Court ruled that “in face of a statute of limitations 
enacted by Congress, laches cannot be invoked to bar legal relief.”54  In so doing, 
                                                                                                                   
 48 Id. at 739–40 (citing NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981); and then citing 
Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). 
 49 568 U.S. 519, 538. 
 50 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 51 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1982 (2014). 
 52 Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1968 (citing S. REP. NO. 1014, at 2 (1957)). 
 53 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. 507(b) (1976). 
 54 Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1974. 
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it explicitly distinguished between the use of state law to fill gaps (which is 
allowed) and the use of state law to override Congressional intent as expressed in 
the language of a statute (which is not allowed).55 
III.  CATEGORIZING THE UNIFORMITY PROBLEMS 
As the foregoing illustrations of uniformity issues in IP cases suggests, there 
are number of possible reasons for a lack of uniformity in the interpretation and 
application of federal law.  As further discussed in Part IV, some of these 
problems might be avoided by better legislative and drafting processes, but 
some of them are inherent in our system of federalism and are largely 
unavoidable.  As noted by Justice Scalia in O’Melveny & Meyers, if the federal 
courts accepted the uniformity argument in every case they would “be awash in 
federal common law rules.”56  More importantly, a lack of uniformity may be 
desirable in some cases, particularly if the asserted ideal of federal uniformity 
conflicts with community norms and other important interests.  In the 
following subsections, the principal reasons why the interpretation and 
application of federal law is not always uniform are explained in greater detail. 
A.  THE INTERPRETATION PROBLEM 
In the same way that the complexity of language often prevents patent 
attorneys from writing perfect patent claims,57 often it prevents Congress from 
writing a perfect federal law.  But the process of statutory drafting is made even 
worse by the horse-trading nature and practical realities of the political process.  
The fact is that legislation is largely written by lobbyists or congressional staff 
and neither appear to care much about how rules of statutory interpretation will 
affect the application of the laws they draft.58  Sometimes the incompleteness of 
a statute is intentional due to an inability to get the law passed otherwise, 
thereby impliedly authorizing federal courts to fill gaps.  Also, as a result of 
these dynamics, federal statutes are often incomplete or riddled with ambiguity.  
Where gaps and ambiguity exist, federal courts do not have the “plain meaning” 
                                                                                                                   
 55 Id. (stating “[t]he expansive role for laches MGM envisions careens away from understandings, 
past and present, of the essentially gap-filling, not legislation-overriding, office of laches”). 
 56 O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 114 S. Ct. 2048, 2048 (1994). 
 57 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).   
 58 See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical 
Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013) (presenting 
the results of the largest empirical study to date of congressional staff statutory drafting practices and 
knowledge of the rules of statutory interpretation); Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics 
of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (2002). 
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of a statute to rely upon and can look to other sources for meaning, resulting in 
potentially different interpretations of the same federal laws by different federal 
courts.  
There are a number of rules of statutory interpretation which, in theory, 
should lead to more uniform results among federal courts that interpret the 
same provision of federal law, but the rules and the specific context in which 
they are applied give courts discretion concerning which rules to apply.59  
Moreover, there is debate about the sources of information that federal courts 
can use when interpreting statutes, particularly with respect to legal maxims60 
and legislative history.61  Thus, to understand the interpretation problem, and 
why it cannot be easily fixed to enhance the uniformity of federal law, requires 
an understanding of both the sources of information and the hierarchy of 
information that are typically used to interpret a statute.  
The process of statutory interpretation usually begins with application of the 
most important canon of construction: a statute shall be interpreted in 
accordance with its plain meaning.62  This often includes statutory definitions, 
but even statutes with a lot of definitions, like the 1976 Copyright Act, 
frequently fail to define key terms.63  Because statutes are not always the picture 
of clarity, courts often look to extrinsic sources of information for guidance.  In 
general order of preference, this includes: (1) a dictionary; (2) the entirety of the 
statute and the context within the statute of the language at issue; (3) canons of 
construction; and (4) legislative history.64  Where an administrative agency is 
involved in applying the law, as is the case with U.S. patent, trademark, and 
                                                                                                                   
 59 See Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness of “Federal Law”: Competence and Discretion in the Choice of 
National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 812–14 (1957). 
 60 See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1179.  
 61 See generally Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 845, 874 (1992). 
 62 Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 164 (1985). 
 63 See, e.g., Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) (involving the 
failure of Congress to define the terms “employee” and “course and scope of employment”). 
 64 See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 61 (2012) (textual approach; “[t]he canons influence not just how courts approach 
texts but also the techniques that legal drafters follow in preparing those texts”); see also Chisom v. 
Edwards, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2369 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissent affirming textualism and correct order in 
statutory interpretation).  Compare with McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 909 (2010) 
(Stevens, J. dissent that “[i]t is not the role of federal judges to be amateur historians.  And it is 
not fidelity to the Constitution to ignore its use of deliberately capacious language, in an effort to 
transform foundational legal commitments into narrow rules of decision.”). 
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copyright law, federal courts will also examine the interpretations of words and 
terms used by the relevant agency.65 
Because rules of statutory interpretation are largely guideposts, and not 
immutable rules, federal courts have discretion to utilize them or not.66  For 
instance, discretion is exercised by individual judges in deciding: which 
dictionary to consult; which definition within a dictionary to use;67 how to 
define the statutory context; whether to look at other federal laws; which 
canons of construction to use; whether to consult legislative history, and, if so, 
what legislative history to use.  It is no wonder, then, that lower federal courts 
often have divergent views about the meaning of the same statute. 
The interpretation of a statute is also necessarily determined by the facts of a 
case and the quality of the information and arguments that are presented to the 
court, with the budgets of litigants and the workload of the lower federal courts 
not always allowing for an in-depth examination of all issues.  Some trial court 
judges will not consider an issue unless it is presented by the lawyers, and thus 
will not consider an interpretation issue sua sponte.  There is also the practical 
problem that the ambiguity of a statute, or the need for a specialized meaning, 
may not reveal itself until it becomes clear that the trier of fact applied it in a 
particular way.  This then leads to the issues on appeal being presented to 
different courts, in different ways, by different litigants, and based upon 
different records. 
Further undermining the ability of federal laws to reflect unified “federal” 
principles of law are several canons of construction that encourage federal 
courts to look to principles of state law to interpret federal statutes and fill gaps.  
The first and foremost is the Erie doctrine, which, as discussed, directs federal 
courts to look to the law of the forum state, not only in diversity cases, but 
when filling gaps in a federal statute.  There is also the “borrowed statute rule” 
which provides that when Congress borrows a statute from another source 
(state or federal), it also implicitly adopts prior interpretations placed on that 
statute, absent an express statement to the contrary.68  As discussed, another 
                                                                                                                   
 65 See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 213 (1954) (“So we have a contemporaneous and long 
continued construction of the statutes by the agency charged to administer them that would allow 
the registration of such a statuette as is in question here.”). 
 66 See Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 819–20 (2013) (noting that an 
“interpretive guide, like other canons of construction, is ‘no more than [a] rul[e] of thumb, that 
can tip the scales when a statute could be read in multiple ways”), quoting Connecticut Nat. Bank 
v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992). 
 67 See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 530–31 (2013) (noting the difficulty 
of deciding which definition of “under” to use). 
 68 See Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 308 (1992) (adopting several states’ definition of 
“punitive damages”); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65–66 (1987) (holding that, 
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canon of statutory construction provides that “ ‘when a statute covers an issue 
previously governed by the common law,’ it is presumed that ‘Congress 
intended to retain the substance of the common law.’ ”69  As a result of these 
and other canons of construction, it is not only possible that the interpretation 
of federal statutes will differ depending upon the state in which a court sits, but 
it is highly likely.  
B.  THE ERIE DOCTRINE AND INTERSTITIAL LAWMAKING 
While reasonable courts can always differ on the interpretation of federal 
law, another reason why federal uniformity is more myth than reality is because 
of the principles of federalism upon which the United States was founded, 
particularly as those principles are expressed in the Erie doctrine.70  Because Erie 
was a federal case brought pursuant to the federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction, 
many assume that the Erie doctrine (which generally requires the application of 
state substantive law in federal cases) is only applicable in diversity cases.  This 
is not true; the doctrine also applies in federal question cases when federal 
courts are required to fill gaps in federal statutes and engage in interstitial 
lawmaking.71  Moreover, for purposes of the present discussion, people seem to 
forget that the Erie decision, itself, was based upon concerns about uniformity, 
including fears of forum shopping.72  However, the concern was not one of 
federal uniformity.  The Supreme Court directed that state law should apply 
where federal law was silent because it did not want a potentially non-uniform 
body of federal common law to be developed and used in competition with 
state law.73  This explains why there is a preference that the law of the forum 
state be used to fill gaps in a federal statute and why there is no “general federal 
common law.”  But it also sets up the probability that anytime a federal statute 
co-exists with state law, forum shopping between state and federal courts or 
                                                                                                                   
because ERISA contained nearly identical language to the LMRA, ERISA must be interpreted in 
accord with the LMRA).  
 69 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 183 (1989) (“Although we must do so 
when Congress plainly directs, as a rule we should be and are reluctant to ‘federalize matters 
traditionally covered by state common law.’ ”).  See also Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 
U.S. 519, 538 (relying upon the common law “first sale doctrine” to interpret language in the 
1976 Copyright Act), quoting Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305 (2010). 
 70 See generally Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 64 (1938). 
 71 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 41.  
 72 Erie, 304 U.S. at 71.  See also Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (quoting Lewis v. 
Mfrs. Nat’l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961) (“Uniform treatment of property interests by both state 
and federal courts within a State serves to reduce uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping, and to 
prevent a party from receiving ‘a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy.’ ”) 
 73 See generally Erie, 304 U.S. 64. 
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between federal circuits will occur as litigants look for the most favorable 
interpretation of the federal law.  
Where a federal statute directly and clearly addresses an issue, the federal law 
applies, but sometimes a federal statute is missing words and definitions or 
includes poor and ambiguous word choices.  In such situations, courts 
interpreting and applying the federal statute face two choices.  First, they can 
decide that Congress did not intend the gaps to be filled at all, let alone with 
state law.  This was the result in a series of cases involving federal patent, 
copyright, and trademark law where the litigants unsuccessfully tried to 
convince the courts to recognize a right of contribution where none was 
specified in the federal statutes.74  Second, federal courts can decide that they 
have the power to fill the gaps.  
Under the second choice, federal courts must decide what law to use to fill 
the gaps, with the principles of Erie strongly suggesting that they should use the 
law of the forum state.  A natural result of applying the law of the forum state is 
a lack of uniformity whenever the applicable law varies from state to state.  
Moreover, this is not the type of circuit split that the U.S. Supreme Court can 
“resolve” unless it determines that one of the limited exceptions to the 
preference for application of the law of the forum state applies.75  While the 
jurisprudence in this area is complicated, three principal reasons for ignoring 
the law of the forum state have been identified: (1) where there is “significant 
conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law”;76 (2) 
where “the policy of the law is so dominated by the sweep of federal statutes 
that legal restrictions they affect must be deemed governed by federal law”;77 
and (3) where there is a “strong national or federal concern originating from the 
Constitution, from tradition . . . or from practical necessity,” including the need 
for federal uniformity.78 
When federal courts determine that they can ignore the law of the forum 
state, they have broad discretion to decide which other sources of law to utilize, 
which might include: the law of a different state; state law as expressed in the 
Restatement of Laws; or uniform laws.79  Thus, even when federal courts decide to 
                                                                                                                   
 74 See, e.g., Chemtron, Inc. v. Aqua Prods., Inc., 830 F. Supp. 314, 316 (E.D. Va. 1993) (patent); 
Lehman Bros. v. Wu, 294 F. Supp. 2d 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (copyright); Getty Petroleum Corp. v. 
Island Transp. Corp., 862 F.2d 10, 16 (2d Cir. 1988) (trademark). 
 75 Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Klaxon Co., 125 F.2d 820, 823–24 (1942). 
 76 See 19 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 41, § 4514 (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assur. Inc. v. 
McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 679 (2006)). 
 77 Id. (quoting Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942)). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 824. 
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“make federal common law,” the process they use can still lead to a lack of 
federal uniformity that will not be resolved until the U.S. Supreme Court hears 
the issue and decides for itself the source of law to use or Congress amends the 
statute to clarify the issue.  
When federal courts decide to apply state law, the potential lack of 
uniformity is heightened by the fact that federal judges often must guess what 
the state law would be in a certain circumstance, sometimes getting it wrong.  
This can happen, for instance, where no state court (and particularly the highest 
court of a state) has ruled on the subject issue of state law, resulting in a lack of 
clarity about what is “the law of the forum state.”  As the Supreme Court 
explained in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., “the proper function of 
the . . . federal court is to ascertain what the state law is, not what it ought to 
be.”80  Sometimes this can be difficult, as the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
found out in Edwards v. Arthur Andersen, LLP.81  In that case, the California 
Supreme Court refused to apply the “narrow-restraint” exception to California’s 
noncompete law, thereby rejecting the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ guess 
about the substance and meaning of California law.82  
C.  THE LIMITS OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND DSPLACEMENT 
Congress can avoid any Erie problems that lead to a lack of federal 
uniformity by enacting federal laws with preemption or displacement clauses or 
by more fully specifying the details of federal law, but Congress often fails to do 
so, even in cases where it is adopting legislation pursuant to a Constitutional 
provision which gives it broad powers, such as the Intellectual Property 
Clause.83  Section 301 of the 1976 Copyright Act provides an example of 
legislatively imposed limits on federal preemption. Congress might have 
exercised its power to preempt all state laws for the protection of creative 
works and information, but instead chose to limit the preemption of state laws 
so as not to include “activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not 
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as 
specified by section 106.”84  Similarly, the DTSA, specifically states that it does 
                                                                                                                   
 80 313 U.S. 487, 497 (1941). 
 81 189 P.3d 285, 288–89 (Cal. 2008). 
 82 Id. at 293. 
 83 Margaret H. Lemos, Interpretative Methodology and Definitions to Courts: Are “Common Law 
Statutes” Different?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW, supra note 23 (noting 
that “explicit delegations of substantive lawmaking power to courts are rare” and giving the 
Federal Rules of Evidence as one example). 
 84 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(3) (1990). 
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not preempt or displace the application of state law.85  This not only means that 
state trade secret law will continue to exist but that, when filling gaps in the 
DTSA, a showing of an intent to preclude application of state law cannot be 
made, except possibly with respect to the “new” provisions of the DTSA.86  
The principal reason that Congress does not routinely preempt or displace 
state law is because of our system of federalism and Congress’s preference that 
state law should apply to fill gaps in federal law.87  In the absence of an express 
preemption clause, the preemption jurisprudence of the Supreme Court makes 
it very difficult to infer preemption.  In fact, some courts apply a “presumption 
against preemption” that can only be overcome by a clear showing of either 
conflict or field preemption.88  As illustrated by the cases summarized in Part I, 
it is possible for state law to be deemed preempted by federal patent laws, but it 
is just as likely that it will not be.  As the Court in Bonito Boats explained: “The 
case for federal pre-emption is particularly weak where Congress has indicated 
its awareness of the operation of state law in a field of federal interest, and has 
nonetheless decided to ‘stand by both concepts and to tolerate whatever tension 
there [is] between them.’ ”89  The case for federal preemption is also weak 
where the public policy of the state is particularly strong. As explained in 
Kiwanis International v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, a case involving a conflict between 
federal trademark law and state anti-discrimination laws: “In sum, it would do 
violence to the delicate balance of power struck by the supremacy clause to 
hold that the tangential federal interest in trademark uniformity preempts the 
principled state interest in eliminating discrimination which is at issue here.”90 
Even where conflict preemption is possible, because application of the 
doctrine depends upon the specifics of the subject state law, it is possible that 
                                                                                                                   
 85 See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I), (II).  This is an example of what Abbe R. Gluck has 
labeled “national federalism,” “statutory federalism” and “intrastatutory federalism.”  In this case, 
a federal statute, instead of preempting or precluding state law, expressly directs the federal courts 
to consider state law.  See generally Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996, 
1997 (2014). 
 86 See Sharon K. Sandeen & Christopher B. Seaman, Toward A Federal Jurisprudence of Trade Secret 
Law, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (2018). 
 87 LARRY M. EIG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 20–21 (2011). 
 88 Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 27 (1982) (upholding “normal presumption”); Crosby v. Nat’l 
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000) (categorizing the types of preemption.); Pac. Gas 
& Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 203–04 (1983).  
See also Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption in the 
Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253. 
 89 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 166–67 (1989) (quoting 
Silkwood v. Kerr–McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984)).  See also FROMER, supra note 23. 
 90 627 F. Supp. 1381, 1392 (D.N.J. 1986). 
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one state’s version of a law will be preempted, but another state’s version of a 
similar law will not be.91  This may look like a lack of uniformity in the 
application of the Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence, but in reality it is 
a result of the fact-specific nature of the implied preemption analysis.  For 
purposes of the federal uniformity argument, the import of the failure of many 
federal laws to preempt state law is that the state law continues to coexist with 
the subject federal law and can be used as a source of law for purposes of both 
statutory interpretation and interstitial lawmaking.  Also, due to the possible 
application of the forum state’s law governing choice of law, it is possible that 
state law that is different from the state where the federal court hearing the case 
sits may apply, heightening possible errors related to that court’s understanding 
of the applicable state law.  
Even when a federal law does not preempt state law, either expressly or 
implicitly, Congress can nonetheless decide to preclude application of the 
forum state law to fill gaps in a federal statute by indicating its intent to 
“displace” state law.  However, while it has such power, due to principles of 
federalism, adherence to “State’s rights,” political obstacles, or simple 
inadvertence, it doesn’t always exercise this power.92  One practical reason is 
that Congress does not always have time to carefully consider how a decision to 
preclude application of state law would affect individuals and businesses in each 
state.  This also illustrates the problems that can result when Congress decides 
to legislate in an area traditionally left to the states, as it did in the case of the 
DTSA.  A federal statute, whether preempting state law or not, is bound to 
upset established relationships and business practices because the existence of 
the federal law creates the environment for forum shopping and can lead to the 
development of different legal principles.  
                                                                                                                   
 91 Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 
52, 67 (1941) (stating “[o]ur task is ‘to determine whether, under the circumstances of this 
particular case, [the State’s] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
full purposes and objectives of Congress’ ”)). 
 92 See, e.g., Adams v. United States of America, 2006 WL 3309873 (U.S.), at *7 (stating Congress 
“expressly negated any possible inference that federal courts were to exercise any ‘common 
lawmaking’ power to fashion torts under the Act in the interest of national uniformity.”  In fact, 
Congress designed the FTCA to tolerate “a great deal of variation from state to state in whether 
behavior will be considered tortious.”), internal citations omitted.  See also N. Star Steel Co. v. 
Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 34 (1995) (analyzing congressional practice of allowing states to fill in 
limitation gaps).  
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D.  APPLICATION PROBLEMS 
Another reason for the lack of uniformity in federal laws is due to the fact-
dependent nature of many of the issues.  This is particularly true when a federal 
statute requires application of a flexible standard or community norms, as is 
often the case with federal IP laws.  For instance, the “reasonable efforts” 
requirement of trade secret law, the “likelihood of confusion” analysis of 
trademark law, and the “fair use” standard of copyright law.93  This is why, 
when people assail the lack of uniformity in a particular area of law (as they did 
in the lead-up to the DTSA with respect to trade secret law under the Uniform 
Trade Secret Act), care must be taken to determine if that lack of uniformity is 
due to a difference in statutory language or a difference in application of the law 
to the particular facts of the case.  Only the first problem has any chance of 
being solved through legislation, and even then, not perfectly due to the other 
uniformity problems noted herein. 
Certain issues in law are more suitable for a rule than a standard,94 like 
stating a rule that the patent term is for twenty years after the filing of a patent 
application.  But even then, the result is not perfectly predictable because the 
rule often includes qualifiers or exceptions, like the definition of “effective filing 
date” and the possibility of patent term extensions.  On the other side of the 
spectrum, some issues in law have a low degree of predictability because the 
outcome is highly fact-dependent or because they require application of 
community norms.  It is with respect to such issues that standards, rather than 
rules, are more common and when uniformity is most difficult to achieve.  
Thus, rather than just arguing for uniformity for uniformity sake, we should 
identify the issues upon which uniformity is key and, as importantly, determine 
whether it is realistic to believe uniformity can be achieved. 
E.  CONFLICTS WITH OTHER FEDERAL LAWS OR THE CONSTITUTION 
The potential for conflicts between multiple federal laws or between a 
federal law and a provision of the Constitution presents another circumstance 
where seemingly non-uniform application of federal law may result.95  Although 
                                                                                                                   
 93 Lemos, supra note 83 (stating a “reasonableness standard plainly invites judicial 
policymaking. The standard requires further elaboration to clarify its contents, and even the 
courts most committed textualists recognize that the text of the statute plays a minimal role in 
that process” (citing Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, “Is There a Text in this Class?” The 
Conflict Between Textualism and Antitrust, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 619, 621 (2005))). 
 94 See Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985) (defining rules and 
standards and explaining the pros and cons of each). 
 95 See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text. 
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the general rule with respect to conflicting federal statutes is that the courts are 
not to prefer one over the other,96 sometimes a determination of Congressional 
preference will be found.97  Where provisions of the U.S. Constitution create 
the conflict, there are two possible scenarios.  First, a federal statute may be 
ruled unconstitutional on its face, in which case a measure of uniformity exists 
because the statute is either constitutional or not.  Such was the case in the 
Trademark Cases, where the applicable federal statute was held unconstitutional 
because Congress did not have the power pursuant to the Intellectual Property 
Clause of the Constitution to enact a federal trademark law.98  Conflicts and a 
resulting lack of uniformity are more likely in the second scenario where a 
federal statute may be constitutional on its face, but is unconstitutional as 
applied.  For instance, in intellectual property cases, the plaintiff might be 
entitled to an injunction in most cases, but in some cases an injunction would 
restrict free speech or violate some other Constitutional right.99  Then, the 
interest in federal uniformity is overridden in favor of a higher valued 
Constitutional right.  
F.  PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
One area of federal law that is more uniform than others is the law 
governing federal civil procedure because the Erie doctrine does not generally 
apply, at least to the extent that there is a properly adopted Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure on the issue in question.100  Where a federal rule of civil procedure 
does not exist on a given point, the analysis can get more complicated as federal 
courts will often apply state laws that while seemingly “procedural” would 
“significantly affect” the results of a case, thereby being deemed 
                                                                                                                   
 96 See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 181 (1989) (quoting Johnson v. Railway 
Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 461 (1975) (stating “where the statutes do in fact overlap we are 
not at liberty ‘to infer any positive preference for one over the other’ ”)).  But see GARRETT EPPS, 
AMERICAN EPIC. READING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 85 (2013) (explaining that a statute 
preferring one state over another, while not Constitutional, “is not necessarily rendered invalid”). 
 97 Richard Steven Rosenberg, Boys Markets Injunctive Relief in the Sympathy Strike Context: Buffalo 
Forge from a Management Perspective, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 665, 677, n.55 (1977) (stating “[t]he 
driving force behind Boys Markets was to implement the strong Congressional preference” (citing 
Boys Markets Inc. v. Retail Clerk’s Union, 398 U.S. 235, 245 (1970))). 
 98 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 96–97 (1879). 
 99 See, e.g., Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 935 (1996) (explaining Communications Decency 
Act section, 47 U.S.C.S. § 223(d), “has a chilling effect on free expression”).  See generally Reno v. 
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 100 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
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“substantive.”101  Thus, a lack of federal uniformity can result from divergent 
interpretations of applicable rules of federal procedure or because the 
procedural issue is deemed to be an issue upon which state law must apply.  
IV.  REFLECTIONS ON THE VALUE OF UNIFORMITY IN IP LAW  
In her article, Overvaluing Uniformity, Professor Amanda Frost raised the 
salient question whether uniformity is a worthy goal and, if so, for what 
reasons.102  The same question can be asked with respect to federal IP laws, 
particularly when Congress decides to intrude upon an area of law that has 
traditionally been left to the states, as it did with the Lanham Act and the recent 
enactment of the DTSA. 
According to Professor Frost, a number of arguments in favor of federal 
uniformity have been asserted over the years, including: (1) the need for federal 
court legitimacy; (2) a desire to improve the plight of multi-state actors; (3) the 
benefits of predictability; and (4) the avoidance of forum shopping.103  The 
legislative history of the DTSA reveals that the second and third rationales were 
principal justifications for its enactment, but it was also argued that a federal 
civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation was needed to place trade 
secrets on par with the existing federal intellectual property laws in the areas of 
patent, copyright, and trademark.  The thought was that, particularly in 
international circles, U.S. trade secret law would not be respected unless it was 
part of federal law.104 
All the foregoing rationales for federal uniformity seem good on paper, but 
as noted previously, for a variety of legal and practical reasons, federal 
uniformity is difficult to achieve even when a detailed federal law is written.  
Moreover, the perceived legitimacy of federal law over state law could easily be 
applied to a wide variety of state laws, such as commercial law, but no one is 
clamoring to supplant the Uniform Commercial Code with a federal law.  In 
fact, if anything, our system of federalism establishes both a Constitutional and 
                                                                                                                   
 101 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945) (“As to consequences that so intimately 
affect recovery or non-recovery a federal court in a diversity case should follow State law.”).  
 102 Frost, supra note 9, at 1581 (stating “[t]o be clear, the claim here is not that uniformity is 
worthless or that inconsistent interpretation of federal law is never problematic, but rather that 
eradicating nonuniformity has too often been given priority at the expense of other values”). 
 103 Id. at 1569. 
 104 See R. Mark Halligan, Revisited 2015: Protection of U.S. Trade Secret Assets: Critical Amendments to 
the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 14 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 476, 483–85 (2015); 
David S. Ameling, Four Reasons to Enact a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 769, 782–86 (2009). 
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institutional preference for the application of state substantive law over federal 
substantive law. 
While policymakers and lobbyists are apt to trot out the rhetoric of 
uniformity whenever they wish to enact a new federal law, because the desired 
uniformity does not always result, it is important to focus on other possible 
rationales for new federal laws.  One such rationale is that a federal law is 
needed to fill a gap that exists in state law, for instance the legal vacuum that 
was created in unfair competition law following the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Erie.105  However, in such cases, the gap might also be filled by a uniform 
state law, as was the case with the Uniform Trade Secrets Act,106 again raising 
the important question why a federal law would be better.  
Sometimes a new federal law is justified by changes in technology that 
require a response that is quicker than either the common law or the drafting 
and adoption of a uniform law can provide.  Both the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act107 and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act108 are examples of 
this approach, but they also reveal that a rush to enact federal legislation can 
result in legislation being enacted before all the problems are known.  Related to 
this rationale is the fact that a federal statute (or a uniform state law) can often 
be used to speed-up or fix the development of common law in a certain area, as 
was the case with the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.109 
Most arguments in favor of federal uniformity focus on the asserted benefits 
of uniformity but fail to explore the reasons why Congress does not act to 
further uniformity in all areas of law.  This underscores the weakness of the 
uniformity argument because it shows that there is no general interest in the 
uniformity of legal principles, only an interest in federal uniformity with respect 
to those areas of law over which Congress wishes to assert control.  Whether 
explained as respect for states’ rights or an inability to get legislation passed, the 
simple fact is that the benefits of federal uniformity are often not enough to 
motivate the enactment of a federal law, even when there are numerous 
conflicting state laws on the subject.  Privacy laws governing the protection of 
personally identifiable information and rights of publicity laws provide two IP-
                                                                                                                   
 105 See Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Law’s Faux Federalism, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
THE COMMON LAW, supra note 23. 
 106 See Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law and Why Courts Commit Error When 
They Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493, 507 (2010) (describing 
the Erie/Sears/Compco squeeze). 
 107 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). 
 108 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1986). 
 109 See Sandeen, supra note 106, at 493. 
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related examples of laws that have been left to the states despite the benefits of 
federal uniformity. 
Although the European Union has embraced the value of uniformity to 
adopt comprehensive privacy and data protection laws,110 comparable laws in 
the United States are a hodge-podge of federal statutes, state statutes, and 
common law,111 leading both to an absence of robust protection (except in 
some specialized areas like healthcare) and inefficiencies that come from 
businesses having to comply with inconsistent state laws.  Apparently, with 
respect to privacy, the usual desire for federal uniformity is overridden by 
industry fears that a federal privacy law might require them to do too much.  
With respect to rights of publicity, numerous states have adopted inconsistent 
laws that have spawned much confusion and litigation and have created rights 
that often conflict with copyrights.112  Although these state laws can be a drag 
on the creation and distribution of creative works, Congress apparently does 
not care enough about federal uniformity to resolve the morass of legal issues 
that have resulted from inconsistent rights of publicity laws.  
V.  POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
On the surface, the goal of uniformity in law seems commendable, but we 
must be clear about whether we want “Erie uniformity,” “federal uniformity,” 
or the “national uniformity” that results from widely-adopted uniform state 
laws.  Because federal uniformity is more myth than reality, the federal 
uniformity argument should be seen for what it is: more of a rhetorical device 
than an achievable goal.  When Congress is truly concerned about federal 
uniformity (as opposed to Erie uniformity), there are steps it can take to 
increase the likelihood of actual uniformity.  But these steps present their own 
problems, not the least of which is the ability to effectuate them. 
                                                                                                                   
 110 See, e.g., Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of Oct. 24 
1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the 
Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31-50 (centerpiece of current proposal for 
Commission Regulation 2012/0011, 2012 O.J. (L 8) 1-22); Directive 2002/58/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 Concerning the Processing of Personal 
Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector (Directive on 
Privacy and Electronic Communications), 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37-47. 
 111 See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d 
(2016) (protection for individual’s health data); Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 
2003, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1681 (2016); Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2016). 
 112 Jennifer E. Rothman, Liberating Copyright: Thinking Beyond Free Speech, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 
463, 479 (2010). 
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First, Congress can always increase uniformity by drafting federal laws with 
more details, including more rules than standards and appropriate and clear 
definitions.  When it does so, the federal courts are required by canons of 
statutory construction to apply the federal law without resort to other resources, 
like the law of the forum state.  But as the Copyright Act of 1976 reveals, even 
the most comprehensive of federal laws are likely to have ambiguities and gaps 
that must be resolved and filled, and bright-line rules are not always possible.  
Thus, the more fundamental issue is whether Congress should provide the details 
or defer to the federal courts to do so, in essence, allowing them to become 
laboratories for better lawmaking overtime and in context.113  In making such a 
choice, as it arguably did with many aspects of federal IP law, at some point 
Congress should either clean-up the mess that its poor legislative drafting caused 
or accept the lack of federal uniformity it created.  Otherwise, without legislative 
fixes, it is litigants and the courts that are burdened with the ill-effects of a lack of 
federal uniformity.  Another alternative is not to legislate in the area at all, leaving 
it up to the states to adopt laws, including uniform state laws, as they see fit.  
Second, when adopting a new federal law, Congress can avoid express or 
implied incorporation of state law and explicitly preempt or displace state law, 
thereby sanctioning federal courts to make “federal common law” to fill gaps 
rather than defaulting to the law of the forum state or other principles of state 
law.  The problem with this approach is that non-uniformity may still result 
until the Supreme Court is heard on an issue.  Moreover, it is an approach that 
is contrary to principles of federalism and concerns about judicial activism.  It 
also increases the possibility that federal law will change longstanding principles 
of state law, such as those that governed trade secret law before the DTSA was 
adopted.  Without careful study and great care, such an approach can 
fundamentally alter the settled expectations of the parties, particularly with 
respect to property and familial rights and other obligations that have typically 
been left to the states to define.  This was a concern about the DTSA with 
respect to the laws of the individual states on restraints of trade until a 
provision was added to require federal courts to take such laws into account.114  
Third, and consistent with the Erie doctrine, Congress can be more resistant 
to legislating in areas traditionally governed by common law.  There are areas of 
law, like U.S. commercial law and trade secret law, where other uniformity-
enhancing mechanisms have already operated to create a largely uniform body 
                                                                                                                   
 113 See Hills, supra note 21, at 1. 
 114 S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 8 (2016) (stating “some members, including Senator Feinstein, 
voiced concern that the injunctive relief authorized under the bill could override state-law 
limitations that safeguard employee mobility and thus could be a substantial departure from 
existing law in those states”). 
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of law.115  When federal law is adopted with respect to such areas of law, it 
threatens to do more harm than good by creating the possibility that non-
uniform principles of state and federal law will develop and litigants will forum 
shop between state and federal courts.  On the other hand, there are some other 
areas of law, like trademark law116 and rights of publicity law, where federal 
intervention can create uniformity where little exists at the time the federal law 
is enacted.  In other words, congressional legislative efforts should focus on 
determining if and how a federal law can improve the existing legal landscape 
by either filling gaps in existing law or speeding up a common law-making 
process that has led to a lack of clarity and predictability.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
While uniformity in IP laws is a laudable goal, one must be realistic about 
the degree of uniformity that can be achieved through the adoption of federal 
laws, or even uniform state laws.  Setting forth uniform rules and standards is 
one thing, being able to ensure particular results on fact-specific issues is quite 
another.  This is particularly true when federal courts are called upon to apply 
such amorphous concepts as “novelty,” “nonobviousness,” “originality,” “fair 
use,” “likelihood of confusion,” and “reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy.”117  
In theory, efforts to make the law “clearer” are always a good idea, but those 
efforts can also backfire because too much specificity and clarity often narrow 
the scope of rights.  It is the classic Goldilocks problem; it is difficult to get 
lawmaking “just right.”  Someone will always lose that hoped to win.  If they 
lose, they might lobby Congress to change the law, but then someone else who 
hoped to win will lose, and if they have a powerful enough lobby, the cycle will 
continue.  Seen in this light, there is something comforting about a lack of 
uniformity because it allows issues to exist and evolve outside of the political 
sphere where they can be argued based upon the facts and equities of the 
situation.  And, in keeping with principles of federalism, often the states are in a 
much better position than Congress to make laws uniform. 
                                                                                                                   
 115 Carlyle Conwell Ring, Jr., A New Era: Cooperative Federalism—Through the Uniform State Laws 
Process, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 375, 377–78 (2010). 
 116 McKenna, supra note 105 (explaining the development of federal principles of trademark law 
in the aftermath of Erie and the adoption soon thereafter of the federal Lanham Act). 
 117  See text accompanying supra note 93.  
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